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Abstract—In this paper, we analyze and improve WIPR,
an RFID identiﬁcation scheme based on public key tech-
niques with efﬁcient hardware implementation. First we
analyze the security and privacy features of WIPR. We
show that a reduced version of WIPR is vulnerable to
short padding attacks and WIPR needs a random number
generator with certain properties to withstand reset attacks.
We discuss countermeasures to avoid these attacks. Then
we propose two variants of WIPR, namely WIPR-SAEP
and WIPR-RNS, to improve its security and to further
reduce its hardware cost. Using an additional hash function,
WIPR-SAEP achieves provable security in the sense that
violating the security properties leads to solving the integer
factoring problem. WIPR-RNS uses a residue number
system (RNS) for computation, and reduces the hardware
costs of WIPR. WIPR-RNS provides a better security
guarantee than WIPR in that it does not use a non-
standard cryptographic primitive in WIPR. WIPR-SAEP
and WIPR-RNS can be combined into one scheme.
I. INTRODUCTION
Radio Frequency Identiﬁcation (RFID) is an auto-
mated object identiﬁcation technology. RFID systems
consist of two main components: tags and readers. Tags
are small radio transponders. They contain the identiﬁ-
cation information of objects to which they are attached.
Readers query these tags for the identifying information
about the objects. Readers often have secure access to a
back-end database. For simplicity, a reader and a back-
end database can be treated as a single entity.
While RFID technology holds great promise in a
wide range of applications such as supply chain, anti-
counterfeiting, and libraries, it also raises signiﬁcant
privacy and security concerns. Since RFID tags respond
to radio interrogation automatically, malicious scanning
of tags is a practical threat. Even if the information
emitted by a tag is encrypted, the information may
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be used to track the tag, thus causing privacy issues.
An equally signiﬁcant problem is authentication. One
purpose of RFID tags is to prove the authenticity of
objects. If an RFID tag can be scanned and replicated,
then a counterfeit tag can be made to impersonate the
authentic one.
RFID protocols must provide privacy and authenticity
under these possible attacks. In addition, an RFID pro-
tocol also needs to be scalable and efﬁcient. An RFID
system may have millions of tags. The RFID protocol
must be scalable to allow the reader to deal with such a
large number of tags. On the other hand, a tag has very
limited computing and storage capacity, so the protocol
must be efﬁcient enough to be executable by a tag.
To design an RFID protocol satisfying all the desired
privacy, security, scalability, and efﬁciency properties
is challenging. Due to the limited resources of RFID
tags, most existing solutions are based on symmetric key
cryptographic tools. Using symmetric key techniques,
secure authentication relies on a symmetric key shared
between a tag and reader. However, privacy makes RFID
authentication different from conventional cryptographic
authentication. For privacy, a tag cannot identify itself
to a reader before an authentication interaction, thus the
reader does not know which key to use in the interaction.
A straightforward solution is for the reader to try every
key. This is prohibitively costly when the number of
tags becomes large. Literature in this area has sought
to reduce the cost of key search. Every such protocol
proposed so far involves some kind of tradeoff among
the desired properties [9].
If public key cryptosystem can be used, then it would
be easier to solve the key search problem. Whether a
public key cryptosystem can be implemented on RFID
tags remains an open problem and has drawn much
effort. In [11], Oren and Feldhofer proposed WIPR,an RFID identiﬁcation protocol based on a randomized
Rabin encryption scheme. WIPR is very efﬁcient in
hardware, requiring only 5705 gates, and its design
aims at strong security and privacy requirements. While
Oren and Feldhofer provided an implementation of the
protocol, they also note that some details of the protocol
design have not been fully analyzed.
Our Contribution. In this paper, we analyze the security
and privacy features of WIPR. We show that a reduced
version of WIPR is vulnerable to short padding attacks
and WIPR needs a random bit generator (RBG) with
certain properties to withstand reset attacks. We dis-
cuss countermeasures to avoid these attacks by properly
specifying the details of the protocol. Then we propose
two variants of WIRP, WIPR-SAEP and WIPR-RNS, to
provide better security and to further reduce the hardware
cost. WIPR-SAEP uses an additional hash function to
achieve provable security. WIPR-RNS uses a residue
number system (RNS) computation to reduce the hard-
ware cost of WIPR. WIPR-RNS may also provide better
security guarantees in that it uses standard cryptographic
primitives instead of the non-standard ones in WIPR. The
two changes (SAEP padding and RNS computing) can
be used independently or combined together.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows.
In Section II, we review some preliminary background
and related works. In Section III, we analyze WIPR. In
Section IV, we present WIPR-SAEP and WIPR-RNS.
Section V concludes the paper.
II. BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORKS
Hereinafter, we use |x| to denote the length of a bit
string x, and we use x||y to denote the concatenation of
strings x and y.
Integer Factoring Problem. Let N = pq where p and q
are large primes and |p| ≈ |q|. The factoring assumption
says that given N, for any polynomial time (in |N|)
algorithm A and any polynomial Q, for sufﬁciently large
|N|, it holds that Pr[(p,q) = A(N)] < 1/Q(|N|), i.e., it
is infeasible to factor N in polynomial time (in |N|) with
nonnegligible probability. |N| = 1024 is often chosen in
practice.
Rabin Function. Let (N,p,q) be the parameters in the
factoring assumption, and in addition, p ≡ 3 mod 4
and q ≡ 3 mod 4. The Rabin function computes y = x2
mod N,x ∈ Z∗
N. The Rabin function is a trap-door one-
way function in that given y = x2 mod N, without
(p,q), to ﬁnd x such that y = x2 mod N is as hard
as factoring N. With (p,q), x can be computed in
polynomial time. Note that there are four distinct x
values such that x2 = y mod N: ±x and ±αx where
α is a nontrivial square root of 1 mod N (i.e., α2 = 1
mod N and α 6= ±1 mod N). Given x and αx, one
can factor N [14, §5.8].
Randomized Rabin Function. Shamir [12] and Nac-
cache [10] simultaneously proposed a randomized Rabin
function. Instead of computing y = x2 mod N, the
randomized Rabin function computes y = x2 + rN
where r is a random number. The randomized Rabin
function is as secure as the Rabin function when |r|
is big enough (|r| ≥ |N| + 80 is recommended). The
ways to compute y = x2 + rN in [12] and [10] are
different. In [12], the numbers x,r and N are represented
using a regular number system and the multiplication
is conventional multiplication. In [10], the numbers are
represented in a residue number system (RNS) and
the multiplication is RNS multiplication. An RNS has
a list of coprime numbers p1,...,pm. Each number
x ≤
Qm
i=1 pi is represented as a list of m numbers
xi = x mod pi. To compute z = x + y in RNS, one
computes zi = xi + yi mod pi. To compute z = xy in
RNS, one computes zi = xiyi mod pi. Note that the
resulting z should be in the range 0 ≤ z ≤
Qm
i=1 pi.
Given the RNS representation (x1,...,xm), x can be
computed using the Chinese Remainder Theorem [14,
§5.2.2].
Short Padding Attacks. To use the Rabin function to
encrypt a message m where |m| < |N|, some kind
of padding is necessary. Some padding schemes are
vulnerable to attacks based on the following result by
Coppersmith [5]:
Theorem II.1 (Coppersmith Theorem). Let N be an
integer and let f(x) ∈ ZN[x] be a monic polynomial of
degree d. Then there is an efﬁcient algorithm (denoted
as Coppersmith algorithm) to ﬁnd all x0 ∈ Z such that
f(x0) = 0 mod N and −N1/d < x0 < N1/d.
In [5], several attacks are identiﬁed for the RSA
function with short padding and a small encryption key
(i.e., y = x3 mod N). The same attacks apply to the
Rabin function as well (i.e., y = x2 mod N). We list
these attacks, and rewrite them for the Rabin function as
follows.
1) The padding function is x = c||m where c is
known to the adversary and |m| < |N|/2. Given
the ciphertext y = (c||m)2 mod N, m can be
computed as follows:
Let C = 2|m|c. Then it holds that
y = m2 + 2Cm + C2 mod N. (1)
2(1) is a univariate polynomial in m of degree 2
(mod N). Since |m| < |N|/2, m can be computed
using the Coppersmith algorithm.
2) The padding function is x = r||m where r is
a random string and |r| < |N|/4. Given two
ciphertexts y1 = (r1||m)2 mod N and y2 =
(r2||m)2 mod N for the same plaintext m, m can
be computed as follows:
Let R1 = 2|m|r1,R2 = 2|m|r2,x1 = m+R1,∆ =
R2 − R1. Then we have
x1
2 − y1 = 0 mod N (2)
(x1 + ∆)2 − y2 = 0 mod N (3)
where x1 and ∆ are unknowns.
x1 can be eliminated from (2) and (3) by taking
their resultant1, and it is easy to verify that the
resultant equals to 0:
ρ(x1
2 − y1,(x1 + ∆)2 − y2) (4)
= ∆4 − 2∆2y2 − 2y1∆2 + y1
2 − 2y1y2 + y2
2
= 0 mod N.
(4) is a univariate polynomial in ∆ of degree 4
(mod N). Since |∆| < |N|/4, ∆ can be computed
using the Coppersmith algorithm.
From (2) and (3) we have
(x1 + ∆)2 − x1
2 = 2x1∆ + ∆2
= y2 − y1 mod N,
then we can solve for x1 and compute m by
parsing x1 = r1||m.
SAEP Padding. In [4], Boneh proposed Simple OAEP
(SAEP), a padding scheme for Rabin function which is
provably secure in the sense that breaking the Rabin-
SAEP scheme leads to factoring N. The SAEP padding
is as follows: x = m||o ⊕ h(r)||r where r is a random
string, |r| > |N|/2, o is a string of 0’s, |m| < |o|, and h
is a hash function. The Rabin-SAEP encryption provides
semantic security under chosen ciphertext attacks, which
implies semantic security under chosen plaintext attacks,
meaning that even if the adversary can choose the
plaintext m, he is not able to distinguish the ciphertext
from a random string of the same size. The security proof
is in the random oracle model which assumes h to be a
random oracle. The proof is based on the Coppersmith
Theorem.
1The resultant of two monic polynomials P and Q is deﬁned as
ρ(P,Q) =
Y
(x,y):P(x)=0,Q(y)=0
(x − y).
The connection between our work and the above
related work is as follows. WIPR is closely related
to Shamir’s randomized Rabin function using a simple
padding, which may be vulnerable to the short padding
attacks. One of our improvements to WIPR is to use RNS
computation, which is similar to Naccache’s randomized
Rabin function. The other improvement is to use a secure
padding similar to SAEP.
III. WIPR
A. Description
Setup. Let (p,q,N) be the parameters of the Rabin
function and let |N| = 1024. In the scheme, RFID
tags are provided with the public key N and a reader is
provided with the secret key (p,q). Each tag is assigned
with an ID.
Challenge. Reader generates a random bit string c where
|c| = 128, and sends c to the tag.
Response. The tag generates a random bit string r,
computes x = MIX(c||r||ID) where MIX is a simple
byte-interleaving operation. The tag generates a random
number r0 where |r0| = 1024 + 80, then computes
y = x2 + r0N, and sends y to the reader.
Verify. The reader solves x2 mod N = y mod N for
x. There are four roots. The reader checks if one of the
roots contains c. If such a root is found, then the reader
parses the root and ﬁnds ID.
WIPR is designed to provide the following properties:
• Secrecy. An adversary observing a protocol ex-
change between a reader and a tag cannot learn
anything about the ID of the tag.
• Full backward and forward privacy. An adversary
cannot determine whether a tag was a part of any
past or future protocol exchange it has recorded,
even if the adversary knows the ID of the tag.
The framework of WIPR is the same as Shamir’s ran-
domized Rabin function in [12]. The main novelty in
WIPR is to use a reversible stream cipher to generate
a long pseudorandom string on the ﬂy which can be
accessed forward and backward. The design of the
reversible stream cipher is as follows. Let si be the ith
state of the stream cipher. To transfer to the next state, the
cipher computes si+1 = si−1 ⊕f(si) where f is a one-
way function. The cipher can also transfer to the previous
state by computing si−1 = si+1 ⊕ f(si). WIPR uses a
boolean function to implement the oneway function f.
The authors of WIPR noted that the boolean function is
somewhat insecure.
3WIPR did not specify some details of the scheme such
as the MIX function and the sizes of ID and r. The
authors of WIPR noted that the parameter sizes need to
be ﬁne-tuned, based on the relative strengths of attacks
against the scheme’s various subcomponents.
B. Analysis
1) Short Padding Attacks Against a Reduced WIPR:
WIPR uses a padding scheme x = MIX(c||r||ID)
before computing y = x2 mod N.2 We consider a
reduced version of WIPR where the MIX function is
not used (i.e., x = (c||r||ID)). We discuss how the
length of r affects the security of the protocol.
First, we show that, if |r| < |N|/4 = 256, then an
adversary can compute the ID of a tag after querying
the tag twice. The adversary queries the tag twice with
the same challenge c, and receives y1 = (c||r1||ID)2
mod N and y2 = (c||r2||ID)2 mod N. The number
x = c||r||ID can be expressed as x = ac + br + ID
where a = 2|ID|+|r| and b = 2|ID|. Let x1 = ac+br1+
ID and let ∆ = (r2 − r1). Then the adversary has
x1
2 = y1 mod N
(x1 + b∆)2 = y2 mod N
and he can solve for ∆ and x1 as shown in case (2) of
the short padding attacks in Section II. Then ID can be
found within x1.
Next, we show that, when |r| < |N|/2 = 512, the
scheme does not provide forward or backward privacy.
Suppose the adversary gets a tag ID at some time. To tell
if a message (c,y) observed at some other time involves
this same ID, the adversary solves the equation
y = (ac + br + ID)2 mod N
for r using the Coppersmith algorithm. If (c,y) is
generated using the ID, i.e., y = (c||r||ID)2 mod N
for some r where |r| <
|N|
2 , then according to the
Coppersmith Theorem, the adversary can compute this
r and verify that y = (c||r||ID)2 mod N. In this
case, the adversary concludes that (c,y) is generated
by this ID. In the other case where y is generated
from another tag ID0, i.e., y = (c||r0||ID0) for some
r0, we show that there does not exist an r such that
(c||r||ID)2 mod N = y. If such an r exists, then it
can be computed using the Coppersmith algorithm. Now
we get two square roots of y: x1 = c||r0||ID0 and
x2 = c||r||ID. It is unlikely that x1 = −x2 since
ID and ID0 are independent, thus we can factor N
2The tag actually computes y = x2+rN. It is equivalent to y = x2
mod N in view of both functionality and security. In the analysis, we
use the notation y = x2 mod N for simplicity.
using x1 and x2. Therefore, in this case, the Copper-
smith algorithm will not output r such that |r| < 512
and (c||r||ID)2 mod N = y. Upon this result, the
adversary can conclude that (c,y) is not related to the
ID. Therefore, the adversary can successfully tell if the
message (c,y) is related to a given ID. This attack is
based on case (1) of the short padding attacks in Section
II.
2) Parameter Choice for WIPR: Two basic counter-
measures can be taken in WIPR to withstand the short
padding attacks.
• use a random padding with a length greater than 512
bits. In this case, even without a MIX function, the
above short padding attacks do not work.
• use a MIX function to spread the random
padding into at least three separated blocks, e.g.,
MIX(c||r||ID) = (r1||ID||r2||c||r3) where r =
r1||r2||r3. In this case, even when |r| < 256, the
above short padding attacks does not work, either.
Note that if r is separated into only two blocks,
an attack is still possible, although the computation
is more complicated and results are not guaranteed
[5].
It is reasonable to assume that longer random paddings
and more separated padding blocks are more resistant to
the short padding attacks. In practice, c is 128 bits and
we assume that ID is 128 bits, then r is 768 bits. A
MIX function may divide r into 32 3-byte blocks, and
insert one byte of c||ID after each block (note that both
the input and output of MIX are generated on the ﬂy).
3) Reset Attacks: In WIPR, a reversible stream ci-
pher is designed to extend a short random string to a
long pseudorandom string. Three such ciphers are used
in WIPR. We note that the reversible stream cipher
only serves to extend a short random seed to a long
pseudorandom string for one identiﬁcation session. One
seed is needed for each individual session. Therefore,
an additional random number generator is needed for
WIPR. We denote this random number generator as
RBG1.
To ensure the security and privacy properties of WIPR,
RBG1 should be resistant to reset attacks, where the
adversary can reset a tag’s internal state to its initial
state. Reset attacks have been considered for standard
identiﬁcation protocols in the smartcard setting [1], and
they have recently been considered for RFID systems [2].
If RBG1 is a pseudorandom bit generator (PRBG), and
its output only depends on a secret initial seed, then the
output of RBG1 can be repeated after resetting. In this
case, the adversary can recover the tag ID as follows.
The adversary resets the tag, queries it with c1, and gets
4the response y1 = (MIX(c1||r||ID))2 mod N. The
adversary resets the tag again, queries it with c2, and
gets the response y2 = (MIX(c2||r||ID))2 mod N.
The adversary chooses c1 and c2 such that they differ at
only one bit. Suppose this bit is the ith bit bi in x =
MIX(c||r||ID) = x1||bi||x2, and bi = 1 in c1. Then
the adversary can solve
y1 = (x1||0||x2 + 2i)2 mod N
y2 = (x1||0||x2)2 mod N
for x1||0||x2 and recover ID.
If RBG1 is a true random bit generator, then the reset
attack does not work. When RBG1 is a PRBG, one way
to avoid the above reset attack is to let the output of the
RBG1 depend on the challenge c. In this case, the above
reset attack does not work, either.
We note that, if RBG1 is a PRBG, then to ensure the
forward and backward privacy of the protocol, the PRBG
should also provide forward and backward security.
More detailed discussion of these issues can be found
in [15].
IV. IMPROVEMENTS
When the padding length is long enough and the
MIX function is properly designed, WIPR can be
considered secure based on the fact that, despite con-
siderable research interest over the last 30 years, there is
still no way of performing Coppersmith-type attacks on
ciphertexts in which c (known), r (random padding), and
m (secret) are sufﬁciently mixed. However, as for any
cryptographic protocol, a “provable security” is usually
preferable to a security based on “no known attacks”.
Informally, provable security means that, in a given
security model, breaking the protocol leads to solving
some hard problem, e.g., the integer factoring problem.
An essential building block of WIPR is the reversible
stream cipher. The reversible stream cipher uses 1238
gates, which is highly lightweight and is critical for
WIPR to be useful on RFID tags. However, as a crypto-
graphic primitive, the reversible stream cipher has not
received extensive public scrutiny, and hence, it may
raise concerns about its security. It would be desirable
to substitute it with a well studied cipher. Also, we are
interested in investigating possible ways to further reduce
the hardware cost of WIPR without affecting its security.
Next, we propose two approaches to improve the
security and to reduce the hardware cost of WIPR.
The ﬁrst is a secure padding based on SAEP. The
resulting scheme is denoted as WIPR-SAEP. The major
additional hardware cost for WIPR-SAEP is a hash
function. WIPR-SAEP is provably secure in the sense
Fig. 1. Rabin-SAEP and WIPR-SAEP Padding
that violating the security and privacy of the scheme
leads to factoring N. The second improvement is to
change the way to compute multiplication. We use RNS
as in Naccache’s randomized Rabin function [10]. The
resulting scheme is denoted as WIPR-RNS. In WIPR-
RNS, we replace the three reversible stream ciphers
in WIPR with one regular stream cipher, hence we
reduce the hardware cost and provide a better security
guarantee. These two approaches can be used together,
if desired.
A. WIPR-SAEP
1) Description: We assume that the total number of
tags is 2s where s < 64. This would be sufﬁcient for
any conceivable application. The padding scheme is as
follows:
x = (c ⊕ (ID||o) ⊕ h(r))||r
where h() is a hash function, |h()| = 128, |r| = 1024−
128, o is a string of 0, and |o| = 128 − s. This padding
is exactly the SAEP padding except that the additional
parameter c has been included. Figure 1 illustrates the
WIPR-SAEP padding and the Rabin-SAEP padding. The
tag then computes y = x2 + r0N and sends y to the
reader. The reader solves x2 mod N = y mod N for
x, parses x as x0||r where |x0| = 128, then computes
x00 = x0 ⊕ h(r) ⊕ c. If the low-order 128 − s bits in x00
are 0, then the high-order s bits comprise the ID.
As in WIPR, x needs to be generated on the ﬂy
and in two directions. In WIPR-SAEP, x is generated
as follows. First, h(r) is computed. Note that a hash
function processes its input in multiple iterations, and the
input is divided into continuous ﬁx-sized blocks. In each
iteration, one block is read and processed. This allows
5r to be generated on the ﬂy instead of being stored in
RAM. Next, (c⊕(ID||o)⊕h(r)) is computed and stored
in the RAM holding c. Then, x can be generated on the
ﬂy in two directions by regenerating r on the ﬂy in two
directions. Computation of x2 + r0N is the same as in
WIPR. Compared to WIPR, WIPR-SAEP only needs one
additional hash function.
2) Security Analysis: We describe the following game
to deﬁne the security and privacy of WIPR-SAEP. The
notations r,r0, and o are the same as in the description
for WIPR-SAEP.
Game 0
• The adversary chooses a random challenge c and
two tags ID0 and ID1, and he sends (c,ID0,ID1)
to the challenger.
• The challenger chooses a random bit b, and a
random r, computes x = ((IDb||o) ⊕ c ⊕ h(r))||r,
chooses a random r0, computes y = x2 +r0N, and
sends y to the adversary.
• The adversary outputs b0. If b0 = b, then the
adversary wins.
It is clear that, if the adversary cannot win the game,
then he cannot track a tag even if he knows the tag ID.
Also the adversary cannot recover the ID by querying
a tag.
We now describe the following Game 1.
Game 1
• The adversary chooses two random messages m0
and m1 where |m0| = |m1| = s, chooses a random
c2 where |c2| = 128−s, and sends (m0,m1,c2) to
the challenger.
• The challenger chooses a random bit b, and a
random r, computes
x = (mb||c2) ⊕ h(r)||r,
chooses a random r0, computes y = x2 +r0N, and
sends y to the adversary.
• The adversary outputs b0. If b0 = b, then the
adversary win.
Game 1 is the same as a chosen plaintext attack game
for Rabin-SAEP, except that the ﬁxed string o is replaced
with c2. We note that choosing o as all 0s in Rabin-SAEP
is arbitrary. Changing it to any other arbitrary string of
the same size will not change the security of Rabin-
SAEP.3 Therefore, a polynomial time adversary in Game
1 cannot win the game with non-negligible probability,
3If we go through the security proof for Rabin-SAEP in [4], then
we will ﬁnd that the all-0 padding only serves as a predeﬁned string;
replacing it with any other string of the same length will not change
the security proof.
since Rabin-SAEP is semantically secure under chosen
ciphertext attacks [4], which implies semantic security
under chosen plaintext attacks.
Next we show that, if WIPR-SAEP is not secure (i.e.,
an adversary can win Game 0), then Rabin-SAEP is not
secure (i.e., an adversary can win Game 1). Suppose
that there is an adversary A0 that can win Game 0. We
construct an adversary A that wins Game 1 as follows.
A plays Game 1 with a challenger C. At the same time,
A plays Game 0, serving as a challenger, with A0. A
receives ID0,ID1 and c from A0. A parses c as c1||c2
where |c1| = s, computes m0 = ID0 ⊕ c1 and m1 =
ID1 ⊕ c1, and sends (m0,m1,c2) to C. C chooses a
random bit b and a random r, computes
x = (mb||c2) ⊕ h(r)||r,
chooses a random r0, computes y = x2+r0N, and sends
y to the A. A forwards y to A0. A0 returns b0 to A, and
A returns b0 to C. The process is illustrated in Table I.
In this process, the interaction between C and A is
the same as in Game 0.
Note that
x = (mb||c2) ⊕ h(r)||r
= ((IDb||o) ⊕ c) ⊕ h(r)||r.
Therefore, the interaction between A and A0 is the same
as in Game 1. It is clear that, if A0 can win Game 1,
then A can win Game 0.
We conclude that, if Rabin-SAEP is secure, then
WIPR-SAEP is secure against tracking even when the
tag ID is disclosed, i.e., it provides forward and back-
ward privacy, and the adversary cannot recover an ID
by querying a tag.
3) Hash Function Selection: WIPR-SAEP requires
a hash function. For RFID tags, block cipher based
hash functions are better candidates than dedicated hash
functions such as SHA1 and MD5 [6], [3]. One example
of such a hash function is H-PRESENT-128, which
provides 128 bit output and requires 2330 hardware
gates [3]. Some other hash functions dedicated to highly
constrained devices provide other options. SQUASH-128
[13] is a keyed hash functions that takes as input a
64 bit key and a 64 bit message, and outputs a 32 bit
message authentication code (MAC). It is expected that
SQUASH-128 requires about half of the number of the
gates required by GRAIN-128 [7], which requires 2133
gates. Although SQUASH-128 cannot be directly used
in WIPR, very low cost 128-bit hash functions using
the similar design may be possible. By using the H-
PRESENT-128 hash function, WIPR-SAEP requires a
total of 5705 + 2330 = 8035 gates in hardware.
6C A A0
parse c as c1||c2
ID0,ID1,c
← − − − − − − −
m0 = ID0 ⊕ c1
m0,m2,c2 ← − − − − − − − m1 = ID1 ⊕ c1
x = (mb||c2) ⊕ h(r)||r
y = x2 + r0N
y
− →
y
− →
b0
← −
b0
← −
TABLE I
B. WIPR-RNS
WIPR-RNS aims to reduce the hardware cost of WIPR
and to remove the reversible stream ciphers of WIPR,
which we consider to be a non-standard cryptographic
primitive. Also the authors of WIPR noted that the
boolean function used to construct the reversible stream
cipher is somewhat insecure. In [10], RNS is used in
the randomized Rabin function. But the goal of [10] is
to reduce the time complexity, and several measures are
used at the cost of additional ROM space. Here we use
RNS to reduce the hardware cost of WIPR, and substitute
the three reversible stream ciphers in WIPR with one
regular stream cipher.
1) Description: First, we give a high level description
of WIPR-RNS. Let p1,...,pm be m coprime integers
such that |
Qm
i=1 pi| > 2048 + 80. p1,...,pm form the
basis of an RNS. A tag receives a challenge c, generates
x. Then the tag computes and sends y = x2 + r0N in
RNS as in Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1: x2 + r0N in WIPR-RNS
for i=1..m do
xi = x mod pi
r0
i = r0 mod pi
Ni = N mod pi
send yi = xi
2 + r0
iNi mod pi
After receiving y1,...,ym, the reader can recover y
and proceed with the veriﬁcation process.
Next, we describe in detail the data representation and
computation in Algorithm 1.
A regular stream cipher is used to generate r and r0
on the ﬂy. Note that in Algorithm 1, r and r0 do not have
to be reversible as in WIPR. Therefore, a regular stream
cipher is sufﬁcient for WIPR-RNS. We may choose
Grain [8] as the selected stream cipher. Grain uses about
1300 gates and may be the most efﬁcient stream cipher
without known ﬂaws.
For the pi’s, we choose the 127 largest 16-bit primes
and a set of 16-bit integers {64526, 64541, 64829,
64843, 65463, 65477, 65509}. It can be veriﬁed that
the integers in the set are coprime. Therefore, the seven
selected integers and the 127 primes are coprime and
form the basis of an RNS. In this RNS, we can express
integers less than 22048+93, which is sufﬁcient for WIPR-
RNS. After these 134 coprime numbers are ordered, the
difference between any two consecutive numbers is less
than 15. Therefore, the 134 16-bit numbers can be stored
in 16+4×133 = 548 bits in ROM, which cost 548 gates.
The tag computes x = MIX(c||r||ID) on the ﬂy the
same way as in WIPR, except that x is generated in one
direction, from most signiﬁcant bit to least signiﬁcant
bit. Therefore, the reversible stream cipher in WIPR used
to generate r in two directions can be replaced with a
regular stream cipher.
To compute xi = x mod pi, x is generated on the
ﬂy as described above, and xi is computed using plain
modular reduction.
N is stored in ROM as in WIPR. It is loaded in
RAM on the ﬂy and Ni is computed using plain modular
reduction.
yi = xi
2 + r0
iNi mod pi is computed using regular
multiplication and plain modular reduction.
The above algorithm uses a 32-bit adder and subtractor
and a 16-bit multiplier, while the result is 2048+80 bits
in length.
2) Analysis: We compare WIPR and WIPR-RNS
which uses WIPR padding in hardware cost and com-
putational efﬁciency. Since we have not implemented
WIPR-RNS in hardware, we only give an approximate
estimation.
In WIPR-RNS, we use one regular stream cipher
to generate r and r0, and remove the three reversible
stream ciphers in WIPR. This saves about 2500 gates.
WIPR-RNS needs additional 548 gates to store the RNS
basis. The computing units (adder, subtractor, multi-
plier, and RAM to hold temporary results) may need
several hundred more gates than WIPR. We estimate
that more than 1000 gates can be saved in WIPR-RNS.
Therefore, the estimated hardware cost of WIPR-RNS is
5705 − 1000 ≈ 4700 gates.
7For time complexity, we compare the number of bit
add/substract operations in computing y = x2+r0N. Let
L be the length of x,N and r0. Let l be the length of
pi. To compute x2 + r0N as shown in Algorithm 1, the
program runs m = L/l rounds. In each round, it takes
3(L−1)l bit operations to compute xi,r0
i, and Ni using
plain modular reduction, and 3l2 + 2l bit operations to
compute xi
2 +r0
iNi mod pi. Therefore, the number of
bit operations in WIPR-RNS is approximately
L
l
(3(L − l)l + 3l2) = 3L2.
In WIPR, it is approximately 2L2. We estimate that
WIPR is about 1.5 times faster than WIPR-RNS.
C. Combining SAEP and RNS
WIPR-SAEP and WIPR-RNS use two different ap-
proaches to improve the security of WIPR. WIPR-SAEP
uses a secure padding, and WIPR-RNS replaces the non-
standard stream cipher with a standard stream cipher.
These two approaches can be combined together. The
combined approach is the same as WIPR-RNS, except
that it computes x = (ID||o) ⊕ c ⊕ h(r)||r instead of
x = MIX(c||r||ID). x is generated the same way as
described in WIPR-SAEP.
In Table II, we give a summary of the security and
the estimated hardware costs of WIPR-SAEP, WIPR-
RNS, and WIPR-SAEP-RNS compared with WIPR. We
assume that WIPR-SAEP uses a H-PRESENT-128 hash
function.
Number of Gates Security
WIPR 5705 No proof
WIPR-SAEP ≈ 8000 Proof
WIPR-RNS ≈ 4700 No proof
WIPR-SAEP+RNS ≈ 7000 Proof
TABLE II
SUMMARY OF HARDWARE COST AND SECURITY
V. CONCLUSION
We analyzed the security and privacy of the WIPR
RFID authentication protocol and proposed two ap-
proaches to improve its security and to further reduce
its hardware cost. We showed that a reduced version of
WIPR is vulnerable to short padding attacks and WIPR
needs a random number generator with certain property
to withstand reset attacks. We discussed countermeasures
to withstand these attacks by properly specifying some
details of WIPR. Then we proposed two variants of
WIPR, namely, WIPR-SAEP and WIPR-RNS. WIPR-
SAEP used SAEP padding to achieve provable security
and privacy. WIPR-RNS used RNS computing to re-
duced the hardware costs of WIPR, and replaced the
non-standard reversible stream cipher in WIPR with
a standard stream cipher. The two approaches, SAEP
padding and RNS computing, can be used together.
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